1 — exponential decay model
Fitted curve — volume
N(t) = A · e−λt + C
A — initial amplitude~120
λ — decay constant (per day)0.048
C — stable floor estimate~27 alerts/day
R² goodness of fit≈ 0.78
Half-life (volume)~14.4 days
Model: peaks envelope follows condensed exponential. Floor C ≈ 27 is non-zero — system does not converge to zero. Equivalent to capacitor discharge with residual voltage.
Volume vs intensity — decoupling
Volume trend (D1→D30)−70%
OCI variance (D10→D30)high σ
Shortest interval on record1 min (D24)
Sub-90min intervals D306
Dimona hits in one day (D30)4 × (record)
Key finding: volume and intensity are partially independent variables. Volume has low residual variance vs trend (predictable). OCI has high variance — encodes tactical decisions, not resource constraints.
2 — change point detection
Doctrinal inflection events — identified shifts
D1 · Feb 28
Mass saturation phase begins. Iran fires at maximum capacity. No interval coordination. GDI 0.8+ from day 1. baseline
D7–D8 · Mar 6–7
Hezbollah entry + geographic division of labor. HZB share rises to 93–94%. Iran begins preserving TELs. shift 1
D14 · Mar 13
Warhead separation doctrine confirmed (Zarzir). Transition from saturation to coercive efficiency. Sub-90min intervals begin. shift 2
D19 · Mar 18
South Pars strike → simultaneous Iran+HZB radar detection begins. 12 dual-front events in 3 days vs zero in D1–D18. shift 3
D25 · Mar 24
Launcher cycling phase: D8-level salvo count from 25% remaining capacity. 13-min record interval. Multi-zone saturation cluster. shift 4
D29 · Mar 28
Houthi entry confirmed. Third independent missile vector. System now has 3 parallel command chains operating simultaneously. shift 5
3 — damped oscillation over decay envelope
OCI time series — offensive compression index · D10–D30
Pattern: subamortized oscillation over exponential envelope. Cycle period ≈ 2–3 days. Each successive peak lower than prior. Dashed line = estimated decay envelope. Prediction: next local minimum D31–D32, next peak below D30 (0.48).
4 — command fragmentation model
Decentralized command risk
Active autonomous IRGC units31 provincial
Pre-delegated launch authorityconfirmed
Central command integrityseverely degraded
Supreme leader proof of life (D13–D30)zero public
Escalation probability by origin
Deliberate central order25%
Provincial autonomous action45%
Houthi / HZB independent30%
OCI × GDI correlation matrix
Larijani elimination → OCI next 48hr = +0.47
South Pars strike → dual-front eventsr = +0.91
Decapitation events → HZB cadence shiftr = −0.38
Diplomatic announcements → Iranian firer = 0.00
Volume autocorrelation (Dt → Dt+1)r = +0.62
Key signal: South Pars (r=0.91) is the strongest correlate in the dataset. Diplomatic announcements show zero predictive value for Iranian fire behavior — r=0.00.
5 — political scenario model
Scenario probability — next 30 days (author estimate, not model output)
Negotiated pause before Apr 635%
3rd deadline extension, no deal30%
Kharg Island / Hormuz operation20%
Energy plant strikes (D37+)10%
Accidental escalation — fragmentation5%
Binding constraint: Iran's 5-point counter-proposal (reparations + Hormuz sovereignty recognition) is an unconditional surrender demand, not a negotiating opening. Requires internal political authority that Mojtaba Khamenei has not publicly demonstrated.
6 — praying mantis template · 1988 analog applied
Surgical maritime coercion — not invasion
1988 Operation Praying Mantis
• Single-day USN action destroyed ~50% of Iranian operational fleet
• Two oil platforms neutralized in Gulf
• Zero ground troops on Iranian soil
• Strategic effect: coerced Tehran without regime-change intent
2026 Indicators
• 2,500 Marines (31st MEU) arrived in Middle East
• 82nd Airborne on alert
• Kharg Island rumors (90% of Iranian oil exports)
• Rubio: "can achieve all objectives without ground troops"
Assessment: Not invasion. Surgical maritime coercion. Objective: compress energy projection capacity, not occupy territory. Fits "strangulation" model: control/neutralize Kharg, force Strait opening by leverage, no advance toward Teherán.
7 — critical uncertainty · the teherán black box
What the data cannot resolve
Mojtaba authority to sign agreementunconfirmed
Central control over 31 provincial nodesseverely degraded
5-point proposal: institutional or factionalambiguous
Supreme Leader proof of life (D13–D30)zero public
Highest-risk scenario (5% prob, high impact): Escalation by fragmentation. A provincial commander, Houthi cell, or Hezbollah unit acts on local interpretation of ambiguous signals. No one in Teherán ordered it. No one in Washington or Jerusalem can easily de-escalate it.
This is not a decision problem. It is a coordination problem in a degraded network with distributed thresholds.